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Josh Bowers  
I applaud Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger for identifying and 
exploring an almost unconsidered problem: excessive prosecutorial 
caseloads.1  Their premise is that in many large jurisdictions, prosecutors 
are so overworked that they cannot adequately individualize guilty pleas, 
assess eligibility and need for rehabilitative programs, comply with 
disclosure obligations and speedy-trial rules, and (more generally) separate 
the legally and equitably innocent from the guilty.  Consequently, excessive 
prosecutorial caseloads have the capacity to burden not only district 
attorneys’ offices but also criminal defendants. 
It is no easy feat to recognize a fresh and practically important problem 
in a criminal justice system that—though shot-through with pathologies—
has no shortage of critics on the lookout to spot them.  For that reason 
alone, their article is a valuable contribution to the literature.  It is all the 
more impressive that they chart this new territory so well.  Nevertheless, I 
have three principal concerns.  First, I sense that the problem is not nearly 
as pervasive as they take it to be.  Second, I believe that prosecutors do not 
so much lack the ability as the will to manage ballooning caseloads (and, if 
I am right, this profoundly changes the takeaway).  Third, I foresee a 
number of reasons—many of which the authors leave unaddressed—to 
worry far more about excessive public-defender caseloads than 
prosecutorial caseloads. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL CLAIM 
My first question is whether prosecutors are genuinely overtaxed and, 
if so, to what extent.  On that score, I do not read the data to adequately 
support the authors’ central claim that the problem is chronic.  Of course, 
we must first settle on a benchmark for what constitutes an excessive 
prosecutorial caseload.  According to the authors, the prosecutorial standard 
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ought to track the standard for public defense.  On these terms, a prosecutor 
should carry ―no more than 150 felonies or 400 misdemeanors.‖2 
As an initial matter, I am not certain that I agree.  As I discuss in Part 
III, it may not be necessary (or even proper) to apply the same aspirational 
standards to both prosecutors and public defenders.  Nevertheless, for 
present purposes, I take the measure as appropriate.  As such, I gather that 
the authors would agree that a mixed-caseload prosecutor (who splits her 
time evenly between felony and misdemeanor cases) ought to handle no 
more than 75 felonies and 200 misdemeanors—in other words, half of each 
of the maximum standalone figures.  If that is correct, then the authors have 
a problem: in more than half of the twenty-four counties examined in a 
national study on which the authors heavily rely, prosecutorial caseloads 
were radically under one figure and/or the other, or nominally under both.  
And in an additional four counties, prosecutorial caseloads just barely 
exceeded the recommended maximums—Orange County (76 felonies, 202 
misdemeanors), San Bernardino County (92 felonies, 176 misdemeanors), 
Tarrant County (99 felonies, 179 misdemeanors), and Bexar County (70 
felonies, 221 misdemeanors).  Remarkably, in only two counties—Harris 
County and Clark County—were prosecutors, on balance, handling more 
than the 150-felony figure (and, even there, not by much: 165 and 166 
felonies per prosecutor, respectively).  More striking, in no county were 
prosecutors averaging more than 400 misdemeanors.3 
The authors seem to anticipate the objection that the national study 
leaves the empirical question open.  In response, they cite to email and 
telephone conversations with prosecutors to back their claim that the 
caseload figures are, in fact, far higher.4  I see no good reason to prefer 
anecdotal self-reports to the empirics of the national study.  First, even 
good-faith estimates are less likely to be accurate than hard findings. 
Second, prosecutors (and, for that matter, public defenders, judges, court 
staff, police officers—almost all employees, really) have vested interests 
(e.g., maximizing resources and leisure, minimizing stress) in perpetuating 
perceptions that they are overworked and underfunded. 
I am similarly skeptical of the authors’ assertion that the national study 
understates the caseload problem by including in the calculation supervisors 
who handle few, if any, cases.5  Why should a supervisor be excluded when 
determining the per capita caseload?  Presumably, she is helping junior 
attorneys handle their cases by providing guidance and feedback and by 
filling in when these prosecutors are on trial on other cases or are otherwise 
indisposed.  If the supervisor is not a valuable part of the team, then she 
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ought to be fired and her position eliminated—or, at a minimum, she ought 
to start picking up cases. 
In the same vein, I do not buy the authors’ claim that we should 
exclude from the calculation ―attorneys whose sole job [i]s to screen 
cases.‖6  Like supervisors, these specialized attorneys perform useful 
functions.  I would think that what is true of the industrial assembly line 
holds for criminal courts: all else equal, horizontal practice (in which labor 
is divided) is probably more efficient than vertical practice (in which an 
assigned lawyer remains with a case from start to finish).7  If that is not so, 
then the prosecution office may simply transition to vertical representation.  
Short of that, I see no reason to exclude from the mix lawyers who handle 
only discrete tasks. 
Nevertheless, I take the authors’ general point, and I recognize that—
even if we were to focus without caveat on only the national study’s data—
there remain six of twenty-four counties where caseloads appear to have 
surpassed the authors’ measure of excessiveness.  And, significantly, these 
counties encompass the major metropolitan areas of Chicago, Miami, Fort 
Lauderdale, Las Vegas, Houston, and Dallas.  Thus, the authors have 
identified a genuine problem that, at a minimum, affects hundreds of 
thousands of criminal cases each year. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE MISDEMEANOR CASE 
On to my principal concern: I wonder whether even the obviously 
overburdened prosecutor is truly as helpless as the authors perceive her to 
be.  What the authors appear to have largely missed is the fact that the 
prosecutor helps make the cases, whereas the public defender only takes 
them.  Thus, the prosecutor has a mechanism to ease her own pain—that is, 
prosecutorial discretion. 
And the authority to exercise discretion matters.  It differentiates the 
reactive public defender, who struggles to keep pace with the assembly line, 
from the prosecutor, who feeds the machine.  More to the point, district 
attorneys’ offices retain almost unfettered legal authority to decline or 
dismiss charges.  Granted, too many declinations or dismissals would ill-
serve the public interest and might be politically unpopular (to the extent 
the public grasped the decisions).  But in some types of cases, there may be 
more play in the joints than in others. 
In particular, when it comes to charging discretion, petty order-
maintenance cases present something of a puzzle: it is in this context that 
prosecutors appropriately may decline or dismiss cases to ease their 
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caseload burden.  Yet it is also in this context that prosecutors are 
particularly unwilling to do so because prosecutors operate under a set of 
institutional and cognitive biases that motivate them to charge petty cases 
reflexively.8  Indeed, in a separate article, I provided data that revealed 
that—perhaps counterintuitively—prosecutors tended to decline petty 
order-maintenance charges at rates significantly lower than serious felony 
charges.9  There, I offered a number of tentative reasons for this 
phenomenon. 
First, professional prosecutors are trained—by education and 
experience—to sort cases into legal categories and thereby to resist 
contextual signals that may set a specific case apart from the mine-run.  
Significantly, this inclination toward broad categorization over 
individualization is a particular problem when it comes to petty public-
order cases, which tend to appear fungible at first glance.  Specifically, 
public-order cases are almost always products of proactive order-
maintenance policing.  In these cases, police typically make arrests based 
on firsthand observation of apparent crime, and prosecutors thereafter 
typically take at face value the officers’ skeletal arrest paperwork (often the 
only information available at the point of charge).  Consequently, 
prosecutors are less likely to spot legally or equitably atypical petty public-
order cases than atypical serious felony cases.  Second, even where legal or 
equitable weakness is apparent, prosecutors carry a presumption of guilt 
that partially blinds them to potentially good reasons to forego charges.  
Third, prosecutors are motivated to charge rather than decline petty cases 
because they can quickly and cheaply bargain for expedient guilty pleas that 
bolster conviction records—a principal performance measure.  Fourth, 
prosecutors know that in the unlikely event of trial, they can better rely on 
police witnesses to appear and testify credibly (or, at least, in manners that 
appear credible).  These biases add up to a powerful prosecutorial impulse 
to file a low-level charge whenever a low-level charge is merely 
cognizable—even in circumstances where the charge is not required (or 
even warranted) by retributive or instrumental principles.10 
More importantly, because prosecutors may underexercise their 
considerable charging discretion, the problem of excessive prosecutorial 
caseloads, in fact, may be a problem (at least partially) of prosecutors’ own 
making.  This is not to say that prosecutors are to blame for acting 
rationally in the face of prevailing perverse incentives, but it does not 
translate that prosecutors are powerless or that the biases are intractable.  It 
does mean that the caseload question is no isolated question—it is 
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inexorably bound up with (and, indeed, secondary to) the discretion 
question. 
Notice, however, how the authors gloss over the discretion question by 
(almost certainly unintentionally) relying on the passive voice.  In their 
terms, prosecutors ―are asked to commit malpractice on a daily basis‖ and 
prosecutors ―are tasked with handling far too many cases.‖11  But of course, 
no one tasks prosecutors with handling cases (except, perhaps, supervisors 
who may demand charges).12  Prosecutors task themselves through their 
own discretionary choices.  If the tasks are too large, prosecutors have 
significant authority—even if they lack sufficient motivation—to change 
course.  Thus, the difficulty for the authors is that they are trying to solve an 
incomplete puzzle.  They foresee only a ―lack [of] time and resources‖ as 
standing between the prosecutor ―achiev[ing] justice‖ and ―win[ning] at all 
costs.‖13  However, in jurisdictions that focus heavily on public-order 
enforcement, the problem is more a lack of will—the unwillingness to 
determine whether a given case is legally or equitably weak or strong. 
In such a setting, real reform would require institutional redesign to 
counteract the biases that produce unreflective charging.  To that end, 
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have recommended that prosecution offices 
create in-house ―hard screening‖ units, modeled after the one in place at the 
New Orleans District Attorney’s Office.14  For my part, I have suggested an 
external lay equitable screen that might check otherwise poorly restrained 
prosecutorial charging discretion.15  By contrast, Gershowitz and Killinger 
propose only to throw money at the problem.  Such a solution is less likely 
to succeed because it disregards the pathology that underlies the problem 
(that is, the underexercise of charging discretion) in favor of treating only 
the symptom (that is, the consequent excessive caseloads).  Worse still, by 
leaving the underlying problem unaddressed, the authors’ proposal may 
enable prosecutors to charge more cases still, as even the authors seem to 
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recognize.16  In fact, as long as the pathology remains, a lack of resources 
may be the best available check against overzealous prosecution. 
Of course, the power of this charging pathology depends upon the 
degree to which order-maintenance policing (and thus prosecution) is a 
priority in a given jurisdiction.  The national study’s data seems to show 
that different counties have adopted radically different approaches to 
misdemeanor enforcement.  For example, New York City prosecutors 
charged ten times as many misdemeanors as felonies, whereas Phoenix 
prosecutors took an almost categorically opposite approach, charging eight 
times as many felonies as misdemeanors.  The authors make no mention of 
this disparity.  They see only excessive caseloads in the data.  By contrast, I 
see a need to parse the cases according to their type and thereafter to pause 
and ask what decisions inform these startling imbalances.  The answer 
could be benign—say, differences in the substantive law across states.  That 
is, Arizona may treat as a felony the kind of conduct that New York treats 
as only a misdemeanor.  But I am skeptical that this is the case.  I suspect 
the answer has much more to do with an executive policy determination—
informed by the ―broken-windows‖ theory—to focus on low-level order-
maintenance offenses in New York City.17 
I understand that the decision to prioritize aggressive order-
maintenance enforcement is not indefensible (though I do not support it), 
but critically, the decision is not inevitable either.18  In any event,
 
I am 
willing to table the larger debate and speculate only that New York City’s 
ten-to-one ratio of misdemeanors to felonies seems sufficiently imbalanced 
to raise serious questions about whether prosecutors are exercising charging 
discretion appropriately.19  One further caveat: by this I do not mean to 
downplay the societal and private costs of the kinds of conduct covered by 
misdemeanor code law.  From a retributive perspective, misdemeanants 
may be normatively blameworthy.  Moreover, from an instrumental 
perspective, effective crime control may require that we prosecute and 
punish misdemeanor offenders to some degree.  Accordingly, my position 
is not that a case is dispensable by virtue of being a misdemeanor; rather, 
just that it might be insofar as misdemeanants are less likely than felons to 
cause harm that requires prosecution.  Thus, especially in misdemeanor 
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In that vein, I think the authors should have narrowed their exploration 
to the counties where prosecutors appear to be overburdened 
notwithstanding measured exercises of charging discretion.  It is not 
possible to say which counties adequately fit this description, but as a rough 
proxy, we can use the counties where prosecutors exceeded the authors’ 
caseload limit while nevertheless filing a balance of misdemeanor and 
felony charges.20  This measure includes the counties encompassing Miami, 
Houston, Dallas, and Las Vegas—counties in which, on average, 
prosecutors charged cases in the range of two-to-one or three-to-two 
misdemeanors to felonies.  But, even as to these counties, I would want to 
know more about whether prosecutors are, in fact, making optimal charging 
decisions.  Only then would I unreservedly join the authors’ call to increase 
funding substantially. 
To my thinking, the principal shortcoming of the article is that the 
authors fail to adequately differentiate between cases that are mala in se and 
mala prohibita, between the serious and the petty, between the violent and 
the non-violent.  Consequently, they neglect to sufficiently ask the first-
order question of whether prosecutors are justifiably exercising (or failing 
to exercise) charging discretion.  To their credit, the authors do not leave 
the discretion question wholly unaddressed, but notably, they raise it only in 
the context of the most serious cases.  For instance, the authors observe that 
prosecutors lack the ability to eliminate even legally dubious cases because 
―political pressure and a strong sense of justice likely prevent[] prosecutors 
from outright dismissing charges against violent felony defendants.‖21  
Notice the focus on violent felony cases.  Admittedly, their analysis of 
those cases may well be right, but significantly, they are talking only about 
certain cases—a fraction of the whole.  The picture they paint is 
incomplete. 
Moreover, this focus on felonies focus ultimately leads the authors to 
make some curious claims.  Consider their intimation that dispensable cases 
are few and far between—that such cases are no more than a ―needle-in-the-
haystack.‖22  Again, the observation may be true of violent felony cases, but 
what about the rest of cases—the non-violent, typically non-felony cases?  
In those cases, the relevant issue may not be to find the needle but to get rid 
of all of the unneeded hay. 
Likewise, consider the authors’ suggestion that ―most local district 
attorneys have no choice but to use almost all of their budgets to handle 
violent crime.‖23  Once again, the focus is on violent crimes to the almost 
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categorical exclusion of all else.  In any event, the empirical claim is almost 
certainly wrong, as indicated by the authors’ own data that show that 
misdemeanor cases, in fact, outnumbered felony cases by an aggregate 
margin of nearly three-to-one in the studied counties.  Even more telling, in 
all five counties in which prosecutors, on average, handled the most 
misdemeanors—that is, the counties encompassing Chicago, Houston, Fort 
Lauderdale, Miami, and Las Vegas—prosecutors also managed felony 
caseloads that met or exceeded the seventy-five felony upper limit.  Quite 
simply, in these counties, prosecutors appear to have had no trouble 
charging misdemeanors notwithstanding their already high felony 
caseloads.  Of course, violent crimes probably require greater resource 
expenditure per case, but the authors provide less-than-zero support for the 
bold assertion that prosecutors are using ―almost all of their budgets‖ on 
these serious cases.  Rather, the only evidence the authors supply cuts the 
other way.  Here, then, it seems the authors have missed not only the 
potential significance of misdemeanor cases but also their very existence. 
III. ALLOCATING FINITE RESOURCES 
Finally, even if I were convinced that prosecutors were exercising 
charging discretion appropriately, I am not certain that I would support the 
authors’ proposal to divide additional resources equally between 
prosecution and defense offices.  Specifically, the authors recommend that 
the system should increase prosecutorial funding in lockstep with funding 
for public defense.24  However, as an initial matter, the authors first must 
demonstrate that there are no preexisting or endemic caseload or resource 
imbalances that currently favor prosecutors.  I am not certain that this is so.  
To the contrary, my understanding is that—in the main, though not across 
the board—prosecution offices tend to be better funded than public 
defender offices and prosecutors are better compensated than public 
defenders.25  I do not see much in their article to contradict this notion. 
It should not have been difficult for the authors to compile data on 
respective budgets.  But rather than offer such figures, the authors provide 
only a dubious analytic argument that purports to demonstrate that the 
defense bar enjoys superior political clout.  That is, they observe that 
defense attorneys are in a ―far better position to generate press coverage for 
themselves‖ and to thereby generate additional resources.26  Really?  A 
district attorney can more easily call a press conference than a defense 
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attorney, and the public, thereafter, is more likely to give the prosecutor a 
sympathetic ear.  More generally, this notion of prosecutor-as-politically-
disempowered-adversary strikes me as a particularly unorthodox account of 
the dynamic in criminal courts.  This is not to say that the authors are wrong 
(and, if they are right, I find the claim to be a fascinating inversion of the 
traditional understanding and a worthy premise for a standalone article).  
However, I need to hear more to adequately dispel the conventional wisdom 
that prosecutors constitute the more influential interest group.27 
Nevertheless, I wholeheartedly agree that all facets of the criminal 
justice system (save corrections) are desperately cash-strapped and that any 
politically feasible infusion of resources would generate more good than 
bad.  But I wonder whether—even if the authors are correct that prosecutors 
are as underfunded as public defenders—there might not remain persuasive 
reasons to direct a greater share of additional monies to public defense and, 
consequently, to leave prosecutors with somewhat bigger caseloads than 
public defenders.  I recognize that for me—a former public defender—this 
is a somewhat dangerous argument.  I open myself up to an ad hominem 
objection—one that the authors rehearse but, to their credit, reject—that 
criminal law scholars (who the authors maintain are more likely to be 
former public defenders than prosecutors) push a liberal agenda that 
benefits their former colleagues and client bases. 
However, there are powerful reasons beyond ideology to direct a 
greater share of additional funding to criminal defense.  First, a point that 
relates directly to my earlier discretion discussion: public defenders need 
more help because they cannot so readily help themselves through 
legitimate choices over whether and how to proceed.  Concretely, defense 
attorneys—and not prosecutors—have diminished authority to regulate their 
own caseloads.  The busy prosecutor decides which little fish to throw back.  
That is, she may forego charges as a matter of generally applicable policy or 
where a defendant is insufficiently blameworthy or the evidence is 
unconvincing in the individual case.  Perhaps more importantly, she may 
redirect resources from one set of cases to another.  Put simply, a prosecutor 
has the flexibility to make tradeoffs, and in doing so, she ensures that her 
money goes further. 
The defense attorney, by contrast, is not so fortunate.  Professional 
responsibility rules discourage the zealous defender from playing cases 
against each other.28  And, of course, a defense attorney may not abandon a 
case simply because her client is loathsome, irredeemable, or—more to the 
point—clearly guilty.29  Occasionally, practical constraints may provoke a 
defense attorney to logroll, but critically, she does so looking over one 
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shoulder.  At best, it is lamentable (albeit practical) for the defense attorney 
to sacrifice the well-being of one client to the well-being of another; at 
worst, it is unprofessional.  Thus, a defense attorney must strive to devote 
time and effort to each of her clients to accommodate concrete client 
interests that almost certainly command more attention, on average, than the 
abstract interests of the public or even the victim (where there is one). 
The defense attorney is more constrained not only by professional 
responsibility rules, but also by constitutional principles.  Defendants—and 
not victims or society—possess constitutional due process and trial rights.  
The defense attorney (and the justice system more generally) must remain 
responsive to these rights.  The authors cede this point, but remarkably, take 
it as a reason to worry less about defendants.  Specifically, they see the 
Constitution as something of a self-actualizing instrument that guarantees 
sufficient resources for public defense.30  If only that were so.  
Unfortunately, federal courts have been less than friendly to claims of 
systemic ineffectiveness.  In fact, I am not aware of even one successful 
federal constitutional claim based on systemic underfunding.31  To the 
contrary, courts have held that defense counsel’s effectiveness must be 
measured only in the immediate case and, critically, only in light of existing 
funding conditions.32  Put simply, the Constitution guarantees effective 
representation, but federal courts have seen fit to leave discrete funding 
questions to the political branches.33  Thus, as a matter of positive 
constitutional law, due process and trial rights have done very little to keep 
the money flowing.  And because positive constitutional law has failed to 
guarantee adequate funding for indigent defense, the political branches may 
need to step up and do more.  On this reading, a public policy choice to 
allocate finite resources to indigent defense promotes not only defendants’ 
interests but also constitutional values that are underprotected judicially.34 
Second, even putting the discretion question to one side, the authors 
still may overestimate the administrative costs of cases to prosecutors and 
 
30
  Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 277 (―While indigent defendants can point to violations 
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, which give them access to the courthouse, prosecutors have 
no such constitutional hook.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
31
  But cf. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 788–90 (La. 1993) (granting a claim of ineffectiveness 
based on systemic underfunding but deciding the case under state, not federal, constitutional law) (link). 
32
  See Wright, supra note 25, at 246. 
33
  See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–03 (1995) (reasoning that federal courts ought to leave 
funding questions to the nonjudicial branches, particularly to government agencies) (link); see also id. at 
112–13 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
34
  Additionally, there is a somewhat more nuanced constitutional point: embedded in the 
prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a normative abhorrence for Type I errors 
(wrongful convictions) as compared to Type II errors (wrongful acquittals).  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 361–64 (1970) (link); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (―[B]etter that ten 
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.‖) (link).  Respect for that principle would seem to 
demand that we do more to ensure that public defenders are adequately funded. 
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underestimate the administrative costs to defense attorneys.  In particular, 
the authors make the claim that ―prosecutors have many 
obligations . . . which defense attorneys do not have to shoulder,‖ most 
notably the obligation to meet with crime victims.35  But, of course, 
prosecutors must coordinate with lay victims only in cases in which there 
are lay victims.  If I am right that a sizable proportion of cases are public-
order cases that involve no concrete victims, then the dynamic shifts 
dramatically.  In public-order cases, prosecutors typically need to interact 
only with professionals—specifically, police officers with whom 
prosecutors can expect to engage efficiently and predictably in a shared 
language.  For them, the immediate case is just one of many of a set type.  
At the extreme, the officer and the prosecutor need not even speak in full 
sentences, but may rely instead on acronyms and jargon designed to 
streamline the process and push cases down familiar and well-traveled 
paths. 
By contrast, the defense attorney must deal with a typically lay (and 
perhaps neophyte) client, who may be scared, frustrated, and distrustful—
ignorant of the law, procedure, and courthouse norms.  It is defense 
counsel’s job to walk her client through a potentially new world—to 
explain to him not only his best legal interests, but the nature and function 
of the process itself.  And the obligations to hand-hold have only increased 
since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision last term in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, which held that effective representation must attend to more than 
just the legal merits of the criminal case, but also to the immigration 
consequences (and possibly much more).36 
Third, the authors claim to be particularly worried that excessive 
prosecutorial caseloads harm defendants.  Indeed, the article’s very 
subtitle—How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal 
Defendants—indicates that the authors’ animating concern is the potential 
for such harm.37  But the authors appear to lack the courage of their 
convictions.  In fact, in some parts of the article they contradict their central 
claim outright.  Specifically, in the latter half of the article, they equivocate 
and speculate, instead, that excessive caseloads generate ―windfalls‖ for 
guilty defendants and impose costs on society in the form of chronic 
 
35
  Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 267. 
36
  130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486–87 (2010) (link).  Although I can speak only to my own experience as a 
public defender in the Bronx, I often had to devote significant time to defendants in cases involving cut-
and-dry criminal-legal issues because those cases also implicated significant social and civil legal issues.  
I felt that it was my responsibility (even pre-Padilla) to address those so-called collateral consequences. 
37
  The claim reappears throughout the text—for example, ―excessive prosecutorial caseloads are 
very damaging to criminal defendants‖ and ―overburdening prosecutors is more harmful than helpful to 
criminal defendants.‖  Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 279, 291. 
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underconviction and underpunishment.38  But, of course, underconviction 
and underpunishment are decidedly defendant-friendly outcomes.39 
To my thinking, the authors’ ambivalence is probably not misplaced 
(though it is reason enough to change the article’s title).  Excessive 
prosecutorial caseloads—like speedy-trial rules and other administrative 
rules, standards, practices, and conditions—may produce a cacophony of 
outcomes, hurting some defendants but helping others.40  Of course this is 
speculation on my part, but that is just the point: any claim about whether 
the defendant is harmed or helped is ultimately empirical.  The authors also 
speculate, leaning heavily one way before listing slightly the other.  But 
they offer their claims as fact, not supposition.  Hence, my criticism is 
twofold: they make no effort to falsify their empirical claims, and they fail 
even to make these claims consistently. 
Nevertheless, for present purposes, I will take the article’s title on its 
own terms and assume that excessive prosecutorial caseloads do, in fact, 
harm defendants.  The question then becomes whether providing more 
funding to prosecutors is the best solution.  I am not convinced.  The 
authors’ contention seems to be that overburdened prosecutors may lack the 
time and resources to examine the legal and equitable merits of the 
immediate case.  I share their concern, but I sense that the most efficient 
way to address the problem may be to allocate more money to public 
defense, not to the prosecution. 
Consider the authors’ example—a robbery case.  The authors deem 
relevant a number of equitable factors: whether the defendant had ―a very 
low IQ‖; whether ―he stole to support his family‖; whether he ―had fallen in 
with a bad crowd after having previously been a good student‖; and 
whether he has ―ties to the community, a high school degree, and . . . [is] 
capable of handling a regular job.‖41  The authors believe that prosecutors 
could and would turn to these questions, if only they had enough resources 
to learn the answers.  As I indicated earlier, prosecutors are perhaps more 
unwilling to individualize than unable.  In any event, my immediate point is 
subtler: the defense attorney is probably better positioned to discern the 
equitable particulars because she has more ready access to the sources of 
such information—that is, to the defendant and his family and 
acquaintances.  Put simply, the defense attorney is more able to speak 
directly and openly with the people who have firsthand knowledge about 
 
38
  Id. at 293–97. 
39
  Particularly, toward the end of the article, Gershowitz and Killinger observe that ―it is 
undoubtedly true that excessive caseloads result in a substantial number of guilty defendants being 
wrongfully acquitted or receiving plea bargain offers that are far too generous.‖  Id. at 293; see also id. 
at 294 (―[P]rosecutors are simply no match for well-funded defense lawyers with adequate time to 
devote to their cases.‖). 
40
  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519–21 (1972) (link). 
41
  Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 1, at 264, 280, 282. 
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the offender.  Thus, if individualization is a principal goal (and I think it is a 
good and worthy goal), then we ought to make sure that the defense 
attorney has sufficient resources to glean the relevant information so that 
she can educate the prosecutor thereafter.  All else equal, we ought to 
allocate money to the actor who can most efficiently engage in the requisite 
investigation. 
Again, I concede that this argument is speculative.  I may be wrong; it 
may be that the prosecutor is better situated to learn at least some of the 
most relevant information—for example, information about the incident 
itself, as opposed to information about the social circumstances of the 
offender.  (Or perhaps not, if we assume that the defendant is guilty and 
therefore has firsthand knowledge about what transpired.)  The question is 
open, but critically, it is the right question to ask and answer before we start 
allocating resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The authors explore a major failing of American criminal justice—the 
fact that too many players are asked to do too much with far too little.  But 
at least when it comes to prosecutors, it is unclear how significant the 
problem is.  In any event, prosecutors have at their disposal a mechanism to 
keep more money in place for the cases that matter to them most.  Put 
simply, prosecutors can charge fewer cases, and the logical place to start is 
with the millions of petty public-order cases that inundate the nation’s 
criminal courts each year—cases for which the charge and disposition are 
sometimes more bookkeeping ritual than warranted crime-control or 
retributive device.42 
To do something about excessive caseloads, prosecutors first must 
overcome the incentive structure that has motivated them to reflexively 
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